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needed to justify a far-ranging modernization and revitalization program. 
What does all this have to do with you, and your attendance at this 
particular conference? 
First, I think all of you will agree that steel and other basic indus-
tries are essential to the economic and social well-being of our nation. 
Therefore, however you feel about the remedies to our problems that I•ve 
outlined to you, this is a subject area that•s worthy of close attention at 
your schools. 
Second, I think that all I 1 ve said confirms the point that•s implicit in 
the overall theme of this conference -- that the environment for business is 
closely intertwined with public policy. You might say that today the 
"political marketplace" is as important to corporate management as the finan-
cial marketplace, or the marketplace for our products. 
And third, it follows that any business school curriculum must fully 
reflect these realities if it is to prepare students adequately for today•s 
real world of business. 
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THE CHANGING IMPACTS OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
The rapid and pervasive expansion in government regulation of business 
which has been occurring in the United States in recent years is altering 
fundamentally the relation between business and government. To begin with, 
suggest that the concept of a regulated industry has become archaic. We now 
live in an economy in which every industry is feeling the rising power of 
government regulation in each major aspect of its day-to-day operations. 
Virtually every company in the United States knows the impacts of a vast array 
of government involvement in its internal decision making. 
If we could accurately measure the pervasiveness of government inter-
vention, I doubt that we would find the economists• favorites -- electric 
utilities and railroads -- at the top of the list. More likely, we would 
encounter such giants of the manufacturing sector as automobile, aerospace, 
and chemical companies, with the oil industry and health services not too far 
behind. Because of the rapid proliferation of government regulatory activity 
in the past two decades, it is difficult to understand the totality of the 
process which is still under way. This presentation is an attempt to provide 
an overview. 
The limitations of this paper should be noted. This is not an attempt 
to evaluate the worthiness of the regulatory programs themselves. Rather, the 
impacts are examined from the viewpoint of the business firm. The costs of 
business compliance with government regulation are a factor that properly 
enters any reasonable benefit/cost analysis of regulation. But surely it is 
only one factor among many that must be weighed in the policy process. 
Murray we1denbaum 1s D1rector of the Center tor the Study of Amer1can Bus1ness 
at Washington University, St. Louis. 
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THE PERVASIVE IMPACTS ON THE BUSINESS FIRM 
It is hard to overestimate the rapid expansion and the great variety of 
government involvement in business now occurring in the United States. The 
major growth of governmental regulation is not in the traditional independent 
regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission and the 
Federal Communications Commission. Rather, the expansion of government power 
over business is occurring by use of the operating bureaus of government --
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, 
Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, and via new operating 
units such as the Environmental Protection Agency. Table 1 shows that 85 
percent of the budgets for federal regulation is assigned to social regulation 
and only 15 percent to the older forms of economic regulation. 
A very substantial further expansion of regulation is in the government 
pipeline. Many of the laws passed in recent years are in the early growth 
stages of development. As the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality pointed 
out in a recent annual report, current estimates of the burden of regulation 
11 do not yet include many costs associated with the hazardous waste section of 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, the Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976, and 1977 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, and the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act ... For most of this 
legislation, the Council pointed out, EPA is still in the process of develop-
ing its final regulations, and the effects will not be felt until business and 
government begin to implement the regulations. 
Similar patterns prevail in other areas. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration has recently issued a generic carcinogenic standard, 
which it has been estimated, will generate compliance costs greater than the 
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total existing array of OSHA standards. The National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration is pursuing mileage goals at a pace which will test the outer 
limits of the survival capacity of the relatively few American companies that 
still produce motor vehicles. 
Indeed, when we attempt to look at the emerging business-government 
relationship from the business executive•s viewpoint, we find a very 
considerable public presence in what historically have been private matters. 
No business, large or small, can operate without obeying a myriad of 
government restrictions and regulations. Entrepreneurial decisions 
fundamental to the business enterprise are increasingly becoming subject to 
governmental influence, review or control -- decisions such as: What lines of 
business to go into? What products and services to produce? Which invest-
ments to finance? How to produce goods and services? Where to lllake tl-tem? 
How to market them? What prices to charge? What profit to keep? 
Virtually every major department of the typical corporation in the 
United States has one or more counterparts in a government agency that 
controls or strongly influences its internal decision making. There is almost 
a 11 shadow 11 organization chart of public officials matching the organizational 
structure of each private company. For example, the scientists in corporate 
research laboratories now do much of their work to ensure that the products 
they develop are not rejected by lawyers in regulatory agencies. The 
engineers in manufacturing departments must make sure the equipment they 
specify meets the standards promulgated by Labor Department authorities. 
Marketing staffs must follow procedures established by government 
administrators in product safety agencies. The location of business 
facilities must conform with a variety of environmental statutes. The 
activities of personnel staffs are increasingly geared to meeting the 
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standards of the various agencies concerned with employment conditions. 
Finance departments often bear the brunt of the rising paperwork burden 
imposed on business by government agencies. 
In short, there simply are few aspects of business activities that 
escape some type of government review or influence. Moreover -- and most 
important-- the impacts of regulation go far beyond general requirements for 
corporate results; they increasingly permeate every facet of internal business 
operations. 
Important internal adjustments are taking place in the structure and 
operation of the typical corporation. Each of the major business functions is 
undergoing an important transformation. These changes tend either to increase 
the overhead costs of doing business or to deflect management and employee 
attention from the conventional tasks of designing, developing, producing, and 
distributing new and better or cheaper goods and services. As Arthur F. Burns 
stated in his Frances Boyer lecture in December 1978, .. As things stand, many 
corporate executives find so much of their energy is devoted to coping with 
regulatory problems that they cannot attend .sufficiently to the creative part 
of their business ...... 
The role of top management is undergoing a fundamental metamorphosis as 
it responds to the changing external environment. The outlook of key 
corporate executives is shifting from primary concern with conventional 
production and marketing decisions to coping with a host of external and often 
strange policy considerations, frequently motivated by groups with non-
business and non-economic priorities. Members of the senior management group 
may become as attuned to the desires of those new interests as to their tradi-
tional accountability to shareholders. 
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It is not surprising that numerous chief executives report that one-
third or more of their time is now devoted to governmental and public policy 
matters --dealing with the many federal, state, and local regulations that 
affect the company, meeting with a wide variety of civic and special interest 
groups that make 11 demands 11 on the organization•s resources, and increasingly 
participating in the public policy arena. Donald Rumsfeld, Chief Executive of 
a major pharmaceutical company ~nd former Secretary of Defense, has described 
very personally the pervasiveness of government involvement in business: 
When I get up in the morning as a businessman, I think a lot 
more about government than I do about our competition, because 
government is that much involved-- whether it•s HEW, IRS, SEC, 
FTC, FDA. I always understood the problem intellectually, but 
the specific inefficiencies that result from the government, 
injecting itself into practically every aspect of our business 
-- that is something one can feel only by being here. 
Some of the most fundamental impacts of governmental intervention are 
discernible in the research and development area, although the ramifications 
are likely to unfold only over a long period of time in the form of a reduced 
rate of product and process innovation. A rising share of corporate R&D 
budgets is being shifted to so-called defensive research, that is, to meeting 
the requirements of governmental regulatory agencies, rather than to design-
ing products with greater customer appeal. The trend is most advanced in the 
automotive industry, where the head of General Motors• research laboratory 
has stated: nwe•ve diverted a large share of our resources -- sometimes up 
to half -- into meeting government regulations instead of devoting better 
materials, better manufacturing techniques, and better products •••• ~~ 
A similar trend is now occurring in the chemical industry, in response to a 
plethora of new laws and regulations, all ostensibly designed to yield a 
cleaner or safer environment. The government, via the regulatory process, is 
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building what amounts to a 11 legal envelope 11 around existing technology. 
A former assistant administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, 
Glenn E. Schweitzer, points out: 
Most research directors are clearly becoming more conservative 
in their approaches to new chemicals. They are not eager to 
become embraced in hassles with the regulatory agencies •••• 
The combined impacts of the rulings of EPA, OSHA, the Food and Drug 
Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission are also altering 
major aspects of the manufacturing function of the typical American business 
firm. One result of the pressures for production processes to meet government 
environmental and safety requirements is that a major share of company invest-
ment -- about one-tenth at the present time -- is being devoted to these 
required social responsibilities rather than to increasing the capacity to 
produce higher quantities or an improved quality of material output, at least 
as conventionally measured. Coupled with the many factory closings due to 
regulation, the result of these socially-imposed requirements is a smaller 
productive capacity in the American economy than is generally realized. 
Moreover, we cannot always assume that the loss of private productivity 
is offset by an improvement in some area of social concern. For example, 
Armco Steel Corporation was required to install special scrubbing equipment 
at one of its plants to reduce the emission of visible iron oxide dust. The 
scrubber does succeed in capturing 21.2 pounds per hour of the pollutant. 
However, it is run by a 1,020-horsepower electric motor. In producing the 
power for that motor, the electric utility•s plant spews out 23.0 pounds per 
hour of sulfur and nitrogen oxides and other gaseous pollutants. Thus, even 
though Armco is meeting government regulations on visible emissions, the air 
is actually 1.8 pounds per hour dirtier because of the government•s regulatory 
requirement. 
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Virtually every aspect of the marketing function of business is 
affected by government. Advertising and product warranties are now subject to 
increasing regulation by the Federal Trade Commission. Labeling and packaging 
is now regulated by the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and Drug Admini-
stration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Department of 
Agriculture. Motor vehicle producers must include mileage ratings in 
advertising; cigarettes must display statements about their probable link to 
cancer; appliances must be labeled according to energy usage; and processed 
foods must list ingredients in specified order. The most severe restrictions, 
however, relate to the increasing power of government agencies to refuse to 
permit the production of products not meeting their standards or requiring the 
recall of products already sold. The latter is a process which is often 
euphemistically referred to as "reverse distribution." 
The primary thrust of many personnel departments has shifted from 
serving the staffing needs of their companies to meeting the requirements of 
and pressures from government agencies. Maintaining complete familiarity with 
applicable regulations, filling out agency forms, and preparing reports to the 
government literally have been elevated to major end products of this tradi-
tional corporate function. One astute observer of the Washington scene has 
pointed out the adverse albeit unintended impact of these regulatory 
activities: "It has become considerably more expensive to employ anyone." 
It is finance departments that often bear the brunt of the almost 
insatisable demand for paperwork from government agencies. To an increasing 
extent, corporate finance units are reacting to external demands for informa-
tion, rather than primarily meeting the corporation's own data requirements 
for internal planning, reporting, and control. This reflects the change in 
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the focus of corporate decision making whereby a variety of outside organiza-
tions and considerations figure so actively. 
Expansions in specialized staff operations often constitute the most 
direct company response to the widening role of government in business. 
Virtually every company is developing some capability to inform itself about 
and evaluate present and future government developments as they relate to its 
activities. Firms of substantial size generally maintain headquarters plan-
ning staffs and Washington offices, while smaller companies rely primarily on 
their trade associations and on Washington-based attorneys and consultants. 
In some cases, substantial changes are made in the corporate organizational 
structure. A major headquarters office on government relations may be 
established by a company, with direct ties to each of its operating depart-
ments, as well as offices in Washington and state capitals. 
Professor Douglas North of the University of Washington contends that 
the key margin of decision making in our society today is access to government 
influence. As he describes the matter, the predictable result "is to shift 
the focus of the investment of resources into attempts to favorably influence 
the strategic government official or to prevent the enactment of governmental 
policies that will adversely affect the interest of groups." The point may be 
overstated. There are still many more opportunities for private undertakings. 
Moreover, the adverse public reaction to massive use of business resources in 
politics would, under present circumstances at least, be overwhelming. Never-
theless, North is indicating an important emerging development, especially in 
the case of the larger business organizations. 
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MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION 
Let us take another look at the phenomenon of regulation. Government 
imposition of socially desirable requirements on business through the regula-
tory process may appear at first to be an inexpensive way of achieving 
national objectives. This practice would seem to represent no significant 
burden on the consumer. However, the public does not get a free or even a 
low-cost lunch when government imposes requirements on private industry. In 
large measure, the costs of government regulation show up in higher prices of 
the goods and services that consumers buy. These higher prices represent the 
11 hidden tax 11 imposed on the public by government regulation. 
First-order effects 
The phenomenon of the regulatory tax is most visible in automobile 
regulation. The newly produced automobile in the United States carries a load 
of equipment which the federal government has mandated must be installed, 
ranging from catalytic converters to heavier bumpers. All in all, there was 
approximately $666 in government-mandated safety and environmental control 
equipment in the typical 1978 passenger automobile. But examination of the 
visible costs, such as to the motorist, provides only the initial or .. first-
order .. effects of government regulation. 
Second-order effects 
It is the indirect or second-order effects that are truly huge -- the 
various efforts involved in changing a company's way of doing business in 
order to comply with government directives. One indirect cost of regulation 
is the growing paperwork imposed on business firms: the expensive and time-
consuming process of submitting reports, making applications, filling out 
questionnaires, and replying to orders and directives. 
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Government regulation can also have strongly adverse effects on employ-
ment. This fact has been demonstrated in the minimum wage area where teen-
agers increasingly have been priced out of labor markets. One study has shown 
that the 1966 increase in the statutory minimum wage resulted in teenage 
employment in the United States being 225,000 lower in 1972 than it otherwise 
would have been. 
It is difficult, of course, to obtain an aggregate measure of the total 
cost involved in complying with governmental regulations. A pioneering effort 
along those lines was made at the Center for the Study of American Business at 
washington University in St. Louis. We culled from the available literature 
the more reliable estimates of the costs of specific regulatory programs. 
Using a conservative procedure, we put the various dollar figures on a con-
sistent basis and aggregated the results for 1976. The total annual cost of 
federal regulation was shown to be approximately $66 billion, consisting of $3 
billion of taxpayer costs to operate the regulatory agencies and $63 billion 
(or twenty times as much) for business to comply with the regulations. Thus, 
on the average, each dollar that Congress appropriates for regulation tends to 
result in an additional $20 of costs imposed on the private sector of the 
economy. 
If we apply the same multiplier of twenty (between the amounts budgeted 
for regulatory activities and the private cost of compliance) to the budget 
figures which are available for more recent years, we can come up with more 
current approximations of the private sector's cost of compliance. On that 
basis, the costs arising from federal regulation of business in the United 
States (both the expenses of the regulatory agencies themselves as well as the 
cost they induce in the private sector) come to a total of $121 billion in 
1979, consisting of $6 billion of federal budget costs and approximately 
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twenty times that amount in private sector expenses of compliance. That is a 
substantial hidden tax imposed by federal regulation, of about $500 per capita. 
Third-order effects 
Yet, the most fundamental impacts of governmental intervention are what 
we can call the third-order or induced effects on the corporation. These are 
the actions that the firm takes to respond to the direct and indirect effects 
of regulation. These responses often include such negative actions as cutting 
back on research and development and on new capital formation because of the 
diversion of funds to meet government-mandated social requirements. The basic 
functioning of the business system is adversely affected by these cumulative 
impacts, notably in the reduced pace of innovation, the lessened ability to 
finance growth, and ultimately the weakening of the capability of the firm to 
perform its central role of producing goods and services for the consumer. 
These difficult-to-measure induced impacts may, in the long run, far outweigh 
the more measurable direct costs resulting from the imposition of government 
authority over private sector decision making. 
For example, the government decision making process can have adverse 
effects on capital formation by introducing uncertainty about the future of 
regulations governing new processes and products. It is becoming increasingly 
difficult for American companies to move ahead with building any new energy 
facilities. A cogent example is furnished in the report by a task force of 
the President•s Energy Resources Council dealing with the development of a new 
synthetic fuel industry. 
The task force stated, for example, that a major uncertainty was the 
length of time that a project would be delayed pending the issuance of an 
environmental impact statement that would stand up in court. They noted that 
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the cost of such delays -- additional interim financing and further cost 
increases in labor and equipment -- is an obvious potential hazard for any new 
project. The task force provided the following evaluation of the overall 
impact of government regulatory activity: 11 In summary, some of these require-
ments could easily hold up or permanently postpone any attempt to build and 
operate a synthetic fuels plant ... 
Consider the innovative product research and development that is not 
performed because corporate research and development budgets increasingly are 
being devoted to what is termed 11 defensive research... A number of companies 
report that they devote large and growing shares of their scientific resources 
to meeting regulatory requirements or avoiding running afoul of regulatory 
restrictions. One hidden cost of government regulation is a reduced rate of 
introduction of new products. 
Where the impact of government is less dramatic, it may be no less pro-
found. A significant but subtle bureaucratization occurs in the corporate 
activity that is undertaken. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA) has shifted much of the concern of the management of pension 
funds from maximizing the return on the contributions to following a more 
cautious approach of minimizing the likelihood that the fund managers will be 
criticized or sued for their investment decisions. It thus becomes safer, 
although not necessarily more desirable to the employees covered, for the 
pension managers to keep more detailed records of their deliberations, to hire 
more outside experts (so that the responsibility can be diluted), and to avoid 
innovative investments. The federal rules also tend to make the pension fund 
manager unwilling to invest in other than blue-chip stocks, thus depriving 
smaller, newer, and riskier enterprises of an important source of venture capital. 
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From such regulatory experiences, we can see that the nation is paying 
yet another price for the expansion of government power -- the attentuation of 
the risk-bearing and entrepreneurial characteristics of the private enterprise 
system. 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMIC THINKING 
It needs to be recognized that impetus for most of the expansion in 
government power over business is not being provided by the industries being 
regulated; generally they have shown minimum enthusiasm for EPA, OSHA, EEOC, 
ERISA, etc. If anything, they claim that the 11 benefits 11 to them of these 
regulations are negative. The pressures for the new style of regulation come, 
rather, from a variety of citizen groups concerned primarily with non-economic 
aspects of our national life -- environmentalists, consumer groups, labor 
unions, and civil rights organizations. 
To talk or write about the regula ted industry 11 Capturi ng 11 its regula-
tors is, to put it kindly, a rather quaint way of viewing the fundamental 
shift in business decision making now taking place, the shift of power from 
private managers to public officials. Yet, the core of the economist•s 
version of the 11 Capture 11 theory still holds - - public policy tends to be 
dominated by the organized and compact pressure groups who attain their 
benefits at the expense of the more diffused and larger body of consumers. 
But the nature of those interest groups has changed in recent years. Rather 
than the railroad baron (a relatively easy target for attack), the villain of 
the piece often has become a self-styled representative of the public 
interest who has succeeded so frequently in identifying his or her personal 
prejudices with the national well-being. In contrast, the business firm, in 
performing the traditional middleman function, typically serves the 
unappreciated and involuntary role of proxy for the overall consumer interest. 
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The changing nature of regulation can be seen with reference to 
Figure 1. The vertical lines show the traditional relationship between the 
old-style of regulatory commission (the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 
Civil Aeronautics Board-- while it is still in existence-- etc.) and the 
specific industry that it regulates. However, the great bulk of the economy 
-- the manufacturing, trade, and services sectors -- is virtually exempt from 
that t~pe of regulation. 
In contrast, the horizontal lines show the newer breed of regulation 
the EPA, OSHA, CPSC, etc. In the case of these relative newcomers to the 
bureaucracy, their jurisdictions extend to the great bulk of the private 
sector and at times to activities in the public sector itself. It is this 
far-ranging characteristic that makes it impractical for any single industry 
to dominate these regulatory activities in the manner of the traditional model. 
Yet, in comparison to the older agencies oriented to specific 
industries, the newer regulators operate in a far narrower sphere. They are 
not concerned with the totality of a company or industry, but only with the 
limited segments of operations which fall under their jurisdiction. If there 
is any special interest that may come to dominate such a functionally oriented 
agency, it is the one that is preoccupied with its specific task --
ecologists, unions, civil rights groups, and consumer organizations. 
Approaches to Regulatory Reform 
Economists are prone to take measurements of economic phenomena. The 
numbers, of course, are not an end in themselves, but an input to decision 
makers. The measurement of the costs and related impacts that flow from 
government regulation is no esoteric matter. This information can be used in 
many ways. First of all, the cost data show the public and the government the 
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economic importance that regulation has assumed, especially as measured by the 
large dollar amounts of resources that are required to be devoted to meeting 
federal mandates. 
Secondly, this information helps to shift the public dialogue onto new 
and higher ground. The pertinent policy questions are no longer, 11 Are you for 
or against clean air or safe products? 11 or other such absolutes. 
Increasingly, the public discussions are in terms of such less emotional and 
long-neglected questions as, 11 How well is the regulatory process working? .. 
and, 11 Are there better ways of achieving the public's desires? 11 
Finally, the availability of information on the costs of regulation is 
an important step in reforming the regulatory process. The presence of the 
cost data inevitably leads to proposals for benefit/cost analyses, cost-
effectiveness studies, risk-benefit evaluations, and similar analytical 
approaches to what in the past too often had been viewed as emotional issues. 
Hopefully, legislation reforming regulatory practices will mandate such 
analytical techniques and thus improve the cost -- and benefit -- data that 
are used in the regulatory process. 
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of regulatory pro-
grams is needed. A parallel can be drawn to macroeconomic matters, where 
important and conflicting objectives are recognized and attempts to trade off 
are made {for example, as between economic growth and price stability). At 
the microeconomic level, it likewise is appropriate to reconcile the goals of 
specific government programs with national objectives. Environmental protec-
tion, product safety, and other regulatory efforts should be related to costs 
to the consumer, availability of new products, and employment. In part, this 
reconciliation can be made at the initial stages of the government process, 
when the president proposes and the Congress enacts new regulatory programs. 
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Benefit-Cost Analysis 
One device for broadening the horizons of government policymakers and 
administrators is the economic impact statement. Policymakers could be 
required to consider the costs (and other adverse effects) of their actions as 
well as the benefits. This is not a novel idea. In November 1974, then-
President Gerald Ford instructed the federal agencies under his jurisdiction 
to examine the effects of the major regulatory actions on costs, productivity, 
employment, and other economic factors. President Carter has continued this 
effort, with some modifications. 
This first step is subject to several shortcomings. Many of the key 
regulatory agencies -- ranging from the Consumer Product Safety Commission to 
the Federal Communications Commission-- are so-called 11 independent agencies, .. 
which are beyond the President•s jurisdiction in these matters. Even in the 
case of the regulatory activities that come within presidential oversight, 
the agencies covered by the Executive Order are required only to examine the 
economic aspects of their actions; the weight they give to economic factors 
remains in their discretion -- to the extent that Congressional statutes 
permit them to give any consideration to economic influences at all. 
A broader approach is needed, one with a strong legislative mandate. 
In the fashion of the environmental impact statements (but without as much of 
the trivia), Congress should require each regulatory agency to assess the 
impact of its proposed actions on the society as a whole, and particularly on 
the economy. Much would depend on the 11 teeth 11 put into any required economic 
impact statement. Merely legislating the performance of some economic 
analysis by an unsympathetic regulator would serve little pu~pose beyond 
delaying the regulatory process and making it more costly. But limiting 
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government regulation to those instances where the total benefits to society 
exceed the costs would be a major departure from current practice. 
Government regulation should be carried to the point where the 
incremental costs equal the incremental benefits, and no further. Indeed, 
this is the basic criterion that is generally used to screen government 
investments in physical resources. Overregulation is not an emotional term. 
It is the economist•s shorthand for regulation for which the costs exceed the 
benefits. 
The critics of the analytical approach to evaluate government regula-
tion tend to forget that benefit/cost analysis is a neutral concept. It gives 
as much weight to a dollar of benefits as to a dollar of costs. And in a 
broader sense, the estimation of benefits and costs need not be necessarily 
viewed in dollar terms. The costs as well as the benefits may at times 
properly be measured in terms of human life. For example, the Occupation 
Safety and Health Administration regulations may have a very high opportunity 
cost when they divert professional safety staffs of the companies from their 
traditional duty of training workers in safer procedures. The 11 benefits 11 of 
following the Federal Register may be far more illusory and surely fewer. 
The implementation of benefit/cost analyses needs a great deal of 
attention. After all, a reluctant agency can merely go through the motions of 
studying the effects of its actions on the economy and proceed a-s it 
originally intended. An agency not directly involved in regulation -- such as 
the General Accounting Office or the Office of Management and Budget -- should 
set government-wide standards, concepts, and methods of performing economic 
evaluations of regulations, including the estimation of benefits and costs. 
The determination of the interest rates to be used in discounting future costs 
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and benefits, for example, should not be a matter left to the judgment of the 
agency which is attempting to justify its own action. Where a dollar sign 
cannot be placed on the benefits, reliance can be placed on cost/effectiveness 
analysis, which is a search for least-cost solutions. 
As a minimum, the Congress should endorse the kind of common sense that 
was embodied in the recent court decision which stopped OSHA from issuing new 
benzene regulations. The court•s language is instructive: "Although the 
agency does not have to conduct an elaborate cost/benefit analysis • • • it 
does have to determine whether the benefits expected from the standards bear a 
reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the standard." 
The ability of the executive branch to change the basic regulatory 
system is limited. Each regulation is issued in accord with a law passed by 
congress. Reform measures cannot simply be "proclaimed," they must be 
legislated. Many of the proposals to reform government regulation involve the 
"sunset" mechanism -- the compulsory periodic review of each major regulatory 
program to determine whether it is worthwhile to continue it in the light of 
changing circumstances. This procedure would provide Congress with a formal 
opportunity to revise the underlying regulatory statutes or to determine that 
1 d d d th t the "sun" should be a given regulatory program is no anger nee e an a 
allowed to "set" on it. A benefit/cost analysis would provide a quantitative 
mechanism to aid in making those value judgments. 
Budgeting as a Management Tool 
Greater attention should be given to the role of the budget process in 
managing regulation. In those cases where an agency•s regulations generate 
more costs than benefits, the agency•s budget for the coming year should be 
reduced, and perhaps vice versa. Because the appropriations for the regulatory 
agencies are small portions of the government•s total budget, limited attention 
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has been given to them in the budget process. In view of the large costs that 
they often impose on the society as a whole, greater attention is warranted 
to the reviews of their appropriation requests via a regulatory budget. 
Changing Attitudes Toward Regulation 
Fundamentally, regulatory reform is not a concern with technical 
measurements or administrative procedures. Rather, government decision makers 
need to take a very different view of the regulatory mechanism than they do 
now. Rather than relying on regulation to control in detail every facet of 
private behavior, the regulatory device needs to be seen as a powerful tool to 
be used reluctantly and with great care and discretion. Basically, it is 
attitudes that need to be changed. Experience with the job safety program 
provides a cogent example. Although the government•s safety rules have 
resulted in billions of dollars in public and private outlays, the goal of a 
safer work environment has not been achieved. 
A more satisfying answer to improving the effectiveness of government 
regulation of private activities requires a major change in the approach to 
regulation, and one not limited to the job safety program. Indeed, that pro-
gram is used here merely as an illustration. If the objective of public 
policy is to reduce accidents, then public policy should focus directly on the 
reduction of accidents. Excessively detailed regulations are often merely a 
substitute -- the normal bureaucratic substitute -- for hard policy decisions. 
Rather than placing emphasis on issuing citations to employers who fail 
to fill forms out correctly or who do not post the required notices, stress 
should be placed on the regulation of those employers with high and rising 
accident rates. Perhaps fines should be levied on those establishments with 
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the worst safety records. As the accident rates decline toward some sensible 
standard, the fines could be reduced or eliminated. But the government should 
not be much concerned with the way a specific organization achieves a safer 
working environment. Some companies may find it more efficient to change work 
rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to retrain workers. The 
making of this choice is precisely the kind of operational business decision 
making that government should avoid, but that now dominates many regulatory 
programs. 
Alternatives to Regulation 
The promulgation by government of rules and regulations restricting or 
prescribing private activity is not, of course, the only means of accomplishing 
public objectives. Codes of behavior adhered to on a voluntary basis can be 
effective. Moreover, government has available to it various powers other than 
the regulatory mechanism. Through its taxing authority, the government can 
provide strong signals to the market. Rather than promulgating detailed 
regulations governing allowable discharges into the nation's waterways, the 
government could levy substantial taxes on those discharges. 
The use of taxation would be meant neither to punish polluters nor to 
give them a 11 license 11 to pollute. Rather, it would be using the price system 
to encourage producers and consumers to shift to less polluting ways of 
producing and consuming goods and services. Price incentives tend to force 
the environmental agencies to consider explicitly the cost of cleaning up 
pollution, while direct controls make it very easy to adopt extremely 
expensive if not unrealistic goals, such as zero discharge. 
In the case of the traditional one-industry type of government regula-
tion (as of airlines, trucking, and railroads), a greater role should be given 
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to the competitive process and to market forces. Unlike the newer forms of 
regulation, the older forms of regulation are often mainly barriers to entry 
into a given industry, protecting existing firms from competition by potential 
new entrants. To date, none of the procedural reforms previously described 
has been enacted by the Congress. Perhaps the most significant single 
legislative action in the regulatory reform area in recent years was the law 
phasing out the Civil Aeronautics Board over a seven-year period. 
With reference to consumer protection, an information strategy can 
provide a sensible alternative to compulsory product standards. For the many 
visible hazards that consumers voluntarily subject themselves to, the most 
important consideration in public policy is to improve the individual's 
knowledge of the risks involved rather than limit personal discretion. In 
their daily lives, citizens rarely opt for zero risk alternatives but trade 
off between speed and safety, for example. 
The more widespread provision of information to consumers on potential 
hazards in various products may, in many circumstances, be far more effective 
than banning specific products or setting standards requiring expensive 
alterations in existing products. The information approach takes account of 
the great variety of consumer desires and capabilities. Interestingly enough, 
this approach often is favored in consumer surveys, although not by some of 
the most vehement representatives of the so-called public interest groups. 
Any realistic appraisal of government regulation must acknowledge that 
important and positive benefits have resulted from many of the regulatory 
activities -- less pollution, fewer product hazards, reducing job discrimina-
tion, and other socially desirable goals of our society. But the 
..external i ti es 11 generated by federal regulation do not justify governmental 
attempts to regulate every facet of private behavior. A reasonable approach 
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to this problem requires great discrimination in sorting out the hazards that 
are important to regulate from the kinds of lesser hazards that can best be 
dealt with by the normal prudence of consumers, workers, and business firms. 
The serious question, of course, is not whether government should deal 
with those market failures, but which techniques and approaches are most 
effective. To an eclectic economist, government regulation should be carried 
to the point where the incremental costs equal the incremental benefits, and 
no further. Those who are concerned that this approach justifies a consider-
able amount of government intervention in the economy may find some solace in 
the words of Friedrich von Hayek in his Constitution of Liberty: ..... a free 
market system does not exclude on principle ••• all regulations governing the 
techniques of production •••• They will normally raise the cost of production, 
or what amounts to the same thing, reduce overall productivity. But if this 
effect on cost is fully taken into account and it is still thought worthwhile 
to incur the cost to achieve a given end, there is little more to be said 
about it. The appropriateness of such measures must be judged by comparing 
the overall costs with the gain; it cannot be conclusively determined by 
appeal to a general principle ... 
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COMMENTS ON PERSONNEL 
Carolyn Eskew 
It has been 16 years since Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act became 
a part of our lives, and we•re still passing acts to make it work and issuing 
guidelines. In 1967, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was passed; in 
1973, the Rehabilitation Act; in 1974, the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment 
Assistance Act; and prior to these was the 1963 Equal Pay Act. 
Two major agencies were established under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act and Executive Order 11246. They are the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, known as EEOC, and the Department of Labor•s Office of Federal 
Contract Compliance Programs, known as the OFCCP. Both agencies are designed 
to enforce antidiscrimination and affirmative action requirements. The EEOC 
deals with individual job bias complaints, while the OFCCP focuses on 
classwide or 11 systemic 11 discrimination by federal contractors. 
These are the acts that affect all companies today. And whether the 
results are good or bad really remains to be seen, I think. The companies 
that are affected the most ar~ those which are probably already making the 
best efforts and would continue to do the most. But somehow, that•s how 
things seem to work. Those firms that are doing, or trying to do, the right 
thing are those which are usually penalized by new laws. 
An order of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission concerning 
sexual discrimination now forbids sexual harassment of employees by employers. 
The order makes employers responsible for any sexual harassment by its super-
visory personnel, regardless of whether the employer knew or should have known 
of such harassment. Three criteria will determine whether an action consti-
tutes unlawful sexual harassment. Unwelcome sexual advances become illegal 
Carolyn Eskew is Personnel 01rector, Carondelet Foundry 1n St. Louis, M1ssour1. 
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